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Abstract 
 Transfer pricing is one of the characteristics and benefits of a 
decentralized company. Business companies usually opt for decentralization 
in order to abandon the principle of centralized management, enhance 
responsibility of the responsibility centres that usually perform the function 
of profit centres, as well as their interest in better corporate performance 
results. Several transfer pricing methods are discussed in scientific literature 
and applied to practice, such as market-based transfer price, cost-based 
transfer price, and negotiated transfer price methods. The paper presents the 
study that analyses the transfer pricing methods, identifies their benefits and 
weak aspects, and presents principles to be followed by the managers of 
responsibility centres and company when choosing the appropriate transfer 
pricing method. During consideration of the most appropriate transfer pricing 
method, the possibility for division to gain profit and receive compensation 
from the central management must be considered. 
 
Keywords: Transfer Price, Decentralization, Cost-based Transfer Price, 
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Introduction 
 Centralized corporate process management has recently been 
characterised by increasing loss in efficiency and growth in complexity 
despite the growing business volumes and need to respond promptly to 
changes. Many companies have been opting for decentralization of business 
process management and transferring responsibility to subsidiaries, branches, 
or autonomous responsibility centres. In a decentralized business 
organization, decision-making authority is not delegated to a few top 
managers. With an internal responsibility system in place, responsibility for 
different business areas is allocated to different employees. In this case, 
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decision making is allocated to managers at the respective level in charge of 
the specific area of responsibility. 
 Transfer pricing is both a requirement and a benefit of 
decentralization. Ever since the year 1957, when J. Herschleifer (1956) used 
the notion of transfer pricing in the research article for the first time, global 
interest in this methodology for promotion of corporate responsibility, 
control, and financial stability has been growing. Majority of business 
companies implementing decentralization face the necessity of developing a 
transfer pricing system to fix the prices on intermediate products traded 
between the responsibility centres within the company. Transfer pricing is 
feasible within the company that has implemented the system of 
responsibility.  
 Transfer pricing is applicable to transactions within a company, i.e. is 
subject to either no or very little influence by the external competition. 
Transfer pricing is an internal proxy for intra-company allocation and use of 
resources and profit generation. Nonetheless, transfer pricing is not only a 
system of efficient internal resource allocation, but also an auxiliary tool that 
helps coordinate actions in the responsibility centres. With the system of 
transfer pricing in place, it is easier for corporate management to manage and 
measure efficiency and profitability of the responsibility centres, while the 
responsibility centres are encouraged to only make the decisions which are 
aimed at increasing the corporate profit. After transfer pricing has been 
implemented in a company, an internal control system is developed and 
applied to all stages of corporate operations: starting with consistent 
motivation for the middle managers in charge of responsibility centres to 
make decisions that are beneficial to the company, and ending with proper 
and fair assessment of the company’s performance. 
 Although methods of transfer pricing are often analysed in research 
works (Adams and Drtina, 2010; Gavious, 1999; Jordan, 1990; Kanodia, 
1979; Turney, 1977), no specific and applicable methodology for 
development and application of the transfer pricing system satisfying a 
number of different corporate aims has been put forward. Matsu (2013), 
Hieman and Reichelstein (2012), Pfeifer et al. (2011), Veres (2011), 
Schuster and Clarke (2010), Gox (2000; 2010), Dikolli and Vaysman (2006), 
Antic and Jablanovic (2000), Baldenius et al. (1999) have described the 
methods of transfer pricing, their benefits and disadvantages. These research 
works suggest that further studies are required to analyse the rationale behind 
the choice of the most appropriate transfer pricing method, functions to be 
satisfied in formation of the transfer pricing system, and performance 
assessment of the system. This has implied the need for deeper analysis and 
synthesis of elements of formation of the transfer pricing system. The 
presented research analyses and summarizes the characteristics of 
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conventional cost-, market-based, or negotiated transfer pricing methods, and 
dedicated suggestions on formation of the corporate transfer pricing system 
to meet the financial and managerial requirements are put forward. 
 Theoretical background of the study is comprised of the study on 
previous research works related to the transfer pricing methods, analysis of 
their benefits and disadvantages, comparison as well as logical and graphic 
summarization, and generation of conclusions and suggestions. Theoretical 
review of the scientific literature has been performed under the methods of 
analysis, synthesis, and logical comparison. Inductive and deductive 
approaches have been used to assess the transfer pricing methods and their 
applicability. The results are presented under the monographic method. 
 
Transfer pricing within the context of company decentralization  
 Business companies always operate in a constantly changing business 
environment, which means that a company must decide on the most 
appropriate management system, which is usually based on either 
centralization or decentralization of management and responsibility for 
performance. Decision-making is delegated to top managers at a centralized 
company, while lower-tier managers are only in charge of implementation of 
the decisions. The number of decentralized companies has been growing 
lately. In a decentralized company, the management system is characterized 
by delegation of the decision-making authority and related responsibility, 
implementation and results of the decisions from the top managers to lower-
tier managers. 
 
Fig. 1. Production management in a centralized and decentralized company 
 
 Decentralization in company simulates market conditions between 
responsibility centres that operate autonomously, although at different levels 
of autonomy (Shuster and Clarke, 2010). Decentralization prompts the 
company to develop the transfer pricing system for an intermediate product 
that is transferred between the responsibility centres within the company for 
the purpose of maximizing the profit earned by the centres despite the 
absence of external competition (Shor and Chen, 2009; Ronen and 
Mchinney, 1970).  
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 Sahay (2003), Gox (2000), Turney (1977) have suggested that 
transfer price is a price applied by responsibility centres to the provided 
services or intermediate products transferred from one responsibility centre 
to another. Application of transfer price is not only related to payment for 
productive resources within the company (Adams and Drtina, 2008; Dopuch 
and Drake, 1964), but also encourages the responsibility centres to achieve 
the level of production which provides the maximum profit to the company 
(Chitiz and Birman, 2012; Shor and Chen, 2009). According to Adams and 
Drtina (2008) application of transfer price in a company could be referred to 
as a mechanism that helps allocate profit between the responsibility centres.  
 Analysis of the research literature (Chitiz and Birman, 2012; Hieman 
and Reichelstein, 2012; Matsu, 2010; Schuster and Clarke, 2010; Shor and 
Chen, 2009 Steven, 2008; Adams and Drtina, 2008; Jordan, 1990; Turney, 
1977; Abdal-Khalik and Lust, 1974) has allowed defining the corporate 
goals that are sought by transfer pricing. The goals are as follows: adoption 
of the most appropriate economic decisions on the planned investment, 
production costs and introduction of technologies; fair resource allocation 
between the responsibility centres, assessment of their performance results, 
and maximization of income; personnel motivation; promotion of production 
of an intermediate product and internal sales; homogenization of the goals of 
top management of the company and responsibility centres. Shilinglaw’s 
(1957) approach, considered classical, suggests that performance of 
responsibility centres should be assessed not only by the profit generated, but 
also by contribution of the centres to implementation of the main corporate 
goal (goals). Therefore, implementation of transfer pricing leads to 
decentralization of the corporate operations by allocating them to the profit 
(responsibility) centres (Indjejikian and Matejka, 2012; Shuster and Clarke, 
2010; Shor and Chen, 2010; Zhao, 2000; Jordan, 1990; Hufnagel and 
Brinberg, 1989; Kanodia, 1979; Ronen and Machinney, 1970; Dopuch and 
Drake, 1964). Such decentralization is beneficial to the company, as profit 
(responsibility) centres are established during its implementation. Middle 
managers in charge of profit centres are responsible for revenue, costs, profit, 
and are authorized to adopt decisions related to profit maximization. Being in 
charge of planning and control of the profit centre performance, the 
managers demonstrate more efficient coordination of the production process 
and the determining factors. Profit-seeking approach encourages middle 
managers in charge of responsibility centres follow the latest information on 
market changes, fluctuation of prices on raw materials and products, as well 
as information on critical situations on the local markets. Finally, profit 
centres update top managers on the mentioned information about the market, 
which is also beneficial to the top management.  
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 Transfer price may also help first-line managers assess performance 
of the profit (responsibility) centres, expressed in individual contribution to 
the corporate profit, more accurately. Transfer pricing system is intended to 
encourage middle managers who are in charge of responsibility centres to act 
for their own benefit, which, in this case, translates into pursuit of corporate 
goals. Such a system, therefore, should be an impetus for the middle 
managers in charge of profit (responsibility) centres to improve their 
performance without compromising the autonomy. 
 Profit (responsibility) centres become less beneficial to a company, 
where middle managers are only focused on operations of their respective 
responsibility centre. In such case, the middle managers do not communicate 
with each other, pursue the policies of their respective centres without any 
consideration of other responsibility centre(s), conceal information, and 
artificially raise costs and transfer price (Shor and Chen, 2009; Kanodia, 
1979; Ronen and Mchinney, 1970). Such relations may lead to failure of 
corporate profit maximization efforts, i.e. failure of the main goal of 
decentralization, which is achievement of common corporate goals through 
implementation of individual goals of the responsibility centres. 
 
Analysis of transfer pricing methods 
 Transfer price is expression of the value of intra-company transaction 
between profit (responsibility) centres. Scientific literature review (Hieman 
and Reichelstein, 2012; Veres, 2011; Schuster and Clarke, 2010; Dikolli and 
Vaysman, 2006; Li, 2005; Mackevicius, 2005; Lengsfeld and Schiller, 2004; 
Antic and Jablanovic, 2000; Baldenius et al. 1999; Gavious, 1999; Sharav, 
1974; Shillinglaw, 1957) has provided a variety of different method of 
transfer price formation. Transfer price may be based on the market price, 
costs incurred by the responsibility centres, or negotiated between the 
responsibility centres. As a result, three approaches to transfer price 
formation have been distinguished: market-based, cost-based, and negotiated 
transfer price methods (Fig. 2.). According to Gavious (1999), a company 
may incur loss where an inappropriate method of transfer price formation has 
been chosen. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the benefits and weak 
aspects of each method to choose the most adequate transfer pricing 
approach satisfying the corporate goal, which essentially is the increase of 
corporate profit or its value, i.e. the cause of transfer price formation.  
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Fig. 2. Transfer pricing methods 
 
As mentioned above, transfer price is formed and used by a 
decentralized company, the organization of which is divided into profit 
(responsibility) centres (Fig. 3). Responsibility centres may produce and sell 
their products as well as engage in other activity independently of each other. 
Transfer price is formed after the responsibility centres have been allocated 
with responsibility for production and/or sale stages. Responsibility centre 1 
(RC 1) produces an intermediate product, RC 1 purchases raw materials on 
the external market. The cost of raw materials purchased is included into the 
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transfer price. Responsibility centre 2 (RC 2) purchases the intermediate 
product from RC 1 to produce the end-product for sale on the external 
market only. RC2 is entitled to purchase the intermediate product on the 
external market, if the transfer price on the intermediate product offered by 
AC 1 is not satisfactory, or if production of the intermediate product is not 
beneficial to the company.  
 
Fig. 3. Sequence of supply – production – sale processes in a decentralized company 
 
 Where the market-based transfer price approach has been chosen, 
market information is the key factor. A profit (responsibility) centre makes 
an assumption that the profit would be achieved at the known market price 
(Veres, 2011). This approach to market price formation is only feasible when 
market information is available, and the intermediate product is competitive 
on the external market. According to Schuster and Clarke (2010), the main 
advantage of the market-based transfer pricing method lies in the fact that the 
established transfer price reflects current market conditions and changes 
along with the changes of market conditions. Transfer price established 
under the market-based transfer pricing method is objective and unbiased 
(Schuster and Clarke, 2010; Antic and Jablanovic, 2000). On the other hand, 
application of this method requires high level of responsiveness and 
flexibility from the middle managers in charge of the respective 
responsibility centers both in collection of the market information and its use 
for transfer price formation.  
 Transfer price calculated under the market-based transfer price 
approach may spark conflicts between the responsibility centres, in 
particular, between the centre supplying and the centre purchasing the 
intermediate product. These responsibility centres perform the functions 
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within the company that are equivalent to that of a seller and supplier on the 
external market. The conflicts emerge when market price is lower or higher 
than the cost of production by the RC (Antic, Jablanovic, 2000). With all the 
necessary external information available, the transfer price is established by 
the responsibility centre which transfers the product within the company as 
follows: 
            TP = p																																																   (1) 
 where: TP – transfer price; 
p – external market price. 
 This method of market price formation refers to the market price only 
and follows the rule of thumb stating that a transfer price must not exceed the 
external market price. Therefore, (1) the equation should be adjusted as 
follows: 
TP ≤ p                          (2) 
Transfer price may be lower than the market price (2), when 
responsibility centres apply intra-company discounts. The discounts may be 
applied in cases of difference between the quality and supply of the product 
produced by the responsibility centre and the product available on the 
market, instability of the product market, and unstable prices. Baldenius and 
Reichelstein (2005) have offered the following calculation method for the 
transfer price including the discount: 
TP = (1-y) p      (3) 
where y – discount. 
 However, transfer price established under this method does not fall 
within the requirements to market-based transfer pricing approach for the 
following reasons: 1) discounts are applicable to other transfer pricing 
methods as well, 2) discount intrinsically implies the need for negotiation, 
which is the key behind the negotiated transfer price method. As emphasized 
by Hiemann and Reichelstein (2012), market price is applied to transfer 
pricing, when the product has the market price, while another transfer pricing 
method is chosen for cases, where the product has no market price. 
 In general, market-based transfer price could be claimed to be 
objective and unbiased, as it reflects current market conditions and changes 
related to fluctuations on the market. Market price is not applicable to 
transfer pricing, if the market is non-competitive or subject to an artificially-
created bubble. A responsibility centre may harm the company, if it adopts 
decisions optimal (favourable) for it in such a situation. Market price that is 
lower than the cost of the intermediate product produced is not beneficial to 
Responsibility Centre 1 (Fig. 3). Another method is applicable in such a 
situation. Responsibility Centre 1 receives benefit, if the market price is 
higher than the costs incurred in production of the intermediate product, and 
RC 1 is able to generate more revenue. On the other hand, higher market 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
73 
price is not beneficial to Responsibility Centre 2. Nonetheless, discounts may 
apply for promotion of the intra-company trade. 
For negotiated transfer price method, transfer price is formed as a 
result of negotiations between middle managers in charge of the 
responsibility centres. During the negotiations, the managers may refer to the 
market price or expenses of the responsibility centre (Fig. 2). Negotiations 
between responsibility centres may take place without any restrictions. The 
goal of negotiations is a transfer price that is acceptable to the both parties. 
Market-based transfer price formation method may be applied in a 
decentralized company with self-sustained, independent responsibility 
centres that enjoy high level of autonomy (Shuster and Clarke, 2010; Li and 
Fereira, 2008). The negotiated transfer price approach is the most suitable, 
where no active market exists for the product, or where the product price 
temporarily rests on the bottom, or the product is of special, exclusive nature. 
In order to avoid conflict situations between middle managers in charge of 
responsibility centres and encourage them to reach an agreement sooner, the 
negotiation procedure must be verified by the top management of the 
company who also establish limitations and trade-offs for certain 
circumstances, as well as the approach towards discounts in formation of the 
transfer price (Dikolli and Vaysman, 2006; Gavios, 1999; Vaysman, 1998). 
In discussion over the negotiation procedures, the influence of transfer price 
on profit of the responsibility centre is discussed, employee motivation 
system is developed, and criteria to be followed during negotiations are 
established. Negotiation procedure should be part of the motivation system 
for middle managers in charge of the responsibility centres, as it is expected 
to promote efficient performance by the employees. 
It has been suggested in the scientific literature (Dikolli and 
Vaysman, 2006; Antic and Jablanovic, 2000; Ghosh, 2000; Vaysman, 1998; 
Borkowski, 1990) that the major disadvantage of the negotiated transfer 
price method is considerable time input required. Negotiations, collection, 
processing, and analysis of the latest information require a great deal of time. 
Middle managers in charge of the responsibility centres prepare for the 
negotiations by collecting information on market prices, costs to ensure 
stronger position during negotiations, learn more about own strengths, as 
well as weaknesses of another responsibility centre. According to Ghosh 
(2000), transfer price agreed to during negotiations is also influenced by 
external sources of supply.  
Other weak aspects also are typical of the negotiated transfer price 
method, namely, lack of the responsibility centre managers’ skills in 
negotiations; loss of potmential favourable sale of the product on the market 
in case negotiations drag on, which causes harm to the company and 
increases costs incurred by the responsibility centres; middle managers in 
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charge of the responsibility centres cheating by presenting distorted 
information or concealing it, which means that the company receives only 
partial possible benefit from the intra-company trade. Negative aspect of this 
method also lies behind assessment of the middle managers’ negotiation 
skills rather than their control over costs in the responsibility centres. 
 If the negotiation process does not cause any conflicts, this method is 
beneficial to the company. The process of negotiations involves sharing of 
the information on business conditions on the local markets and cash flows. 
This information is used for improvement of efficiency of the responsibility 
centres. 
 Negotiated transfer price method is beneficial to a company, where 
middle managers in charge of the responsibility centres are able to negotiate 
on the transfer price without any restrictions, or where market price has been 
subject to artificially-created bubble (Dikolli and Vaysman, 2006, Antic and 
Jablanovic, 2000; Baldenus et al., 1999; Vaysman 1998). During 
negotiations, middle managers in charge of the responsibility centres may 
agree on the transfer price that is lower than the market price. Transfer price 
formed by company managers must promote intra-company trade. In this 
case, responsibility centres may be provided with discounts or certain 
guarantees under the condition, however, that decisions made by the RC 
managers contribute to achievement of common goals related to the 
corporate profit. Lower transfer price may not only lead to growth of sales 
volumes on the intra-company market, but also improvement of the 
company’s competitive advantage on the external market (Yao, 2013). 
Wheeler and Typpo (2013) have suggested that, in case of the negotiated 
transfer price method, transfer price formation is subject to the following 
parameters: max transfer price = market price; min transfer price = costs 
incurred by the responsibility centre. With reference to these parameters, 
transfer price is formed under the following principle during negotiations:  
TP   . ≤ TP ≤	TP      (4) 
where: TP – transfer price; 
   TP   . – minimum transfer price; 
   TP   – maximum transfer price. 
 With reference to characteristics of the minimum and maximum 
transfer prices, the prices may be expressed as follows: 
TP    = 	p    (5) 
TPmin = (1+ g) VC   (6) 
where: p – external market price; 
   VC – variable cost of production; 
   g – opportunity cost established by the enterprise. 
 Negotiated transfer price method is beneficial, where offers on 
transfer price and responses are provided promptly. Nonetheless, the method 
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is not applicable where it causes conflict situations and disputes between the 
responsibility centres. Time is wasted on dispute solving, costs incurred by 
the responsibility centres increase and reduce the corporate profit. 
 Cost-based transfer price, as claimed by Antic and Jablonovic (2000), 
is the simplest transfer pricing method, as the transfer price is calculated on 
the basis of production costs required for production of the respective 
product. Main benefits of this method: simplicity; coverage of all costs of 
production and other business functions; may be applied, where no market 
price is available; time-saving; eliminates friction between managers of the 
responsibility centres; provides time to remove the emerging problems or 
challenges (Dikolli and Vaysman, 2006; Antic and Jablanovic, 2000; Sharav, 
1974). According to Matsui (2013), 46 % of enterprises opt for the method 
of cost-based transfer price. 
 Nonetheless, deeper analysis of the method has revealed its 
underlying complexity. Cost-based method requires considerable 
information base and its analysis. During establishment of transfer price 
under the cost-based method, market conditions, as well as price policy, 
behaviour of market participants, price sensitivity, competitors must be 
considered. Employees should also be aware of the structure of product 
market, where they sell their products, and habits of their clients. 
 The following costs may be used as the basis for establishment of 
transfer price under the cost-based method (Fig. 2): standard (Schuster and 
Clarke, 2010; Lengsfeld and Schiller, 2004; Antic and Jablanovic, 2000; 
Baldenius et al., 1999), actual (Pfeiffer et al., 2011; Schuster and Clarke, 
2010; Lengsfeld and Schiller, 2004; Sharav, 1974), variable (Sahay, 2003; 
Antic and Jablanovic, 2000), marginal (Gavious, 1999; Sharav, 1974), or 
total costs (Veres, 2011; Li, 2005, Antic and Jablanovic, 2000). Where 
transfer price is calculated based on costs only, the following equation 
(Sahay, 2003) applies: 
TP	 = 	qk       (7) 
where: TP – transfer price; 
    q – quantity of the intermediate product; 
    k – costs per product unit. 
 Under cost plus method (Schuster and Clarke, 2010; Mackevicius, 
2005; Hung Chan and Lo, 2004; Gavious, 1999; Sharav, 1974), transfer price 
is calculated by adding markup to the product cost. Markup provides the 
contractual profit to the responsibility centre and may be applied irrespective 
of the type of costs used as the basis for the transfer price.  
 Two options of markup calculation used in the cost plus method are 
available: multiplicative markup, additive markup, or combination of the 
both. 
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 In the multiplicative markup method, transfer price is calculated 
under the following equation (Sahay, 2003): 
TP	 = 	 (1 + m)qk   (8) 
where: m – fixed percentage added to variable costs. 
 Where multiplicative markup method is applied, the company faces 
challenges related to choice of multiplicative markup m, as large markup 
may lead to sales slowdown. This may be avoided by using additive markup, 
when transfer price is calculated under the following equation (Sahay, 2003): 
TP	 = 	q(k + a)                 (9) 
where: a – cash markup per product unit. 
 Sahay (2003) has offered combining equations (8) and (9), and 
calculating the transfer price by the cost-based transfer pricing method under 
the following equation: 
TP = qμ	(k)																																														 (10) 
where: μ ≥1 
 Transfer price calculated under equation (10) covers all production 
costs incurred by RC 1 that produces the intermediate product. The revenue 
generated by the responsibility centre may be used for investment within the 
centre. Under equation (10), responsibility centres are not interested in 
artificial raising of their costs, which may help avoid the key weakness of all 
transfer price formation methods – distortion of cost-related information. 
 With the cost-based method in place, managers of a decentralized 
company must carefully choose an equation of the cost-based method to 
calculate the transfer price, as incorrect transfer price leads to reduction of 
production volumes and corporate revenue.  
 In general, the cost-based method may be claimed as a convenient 
and time-saving approach; however, the company may incur losses, if faulty 
information is used. Transfer price calculated using faulty data from 
statements submitted by the responsibility centres distorts information, and 
middle managers in charge of the responsibility centres adopt inadequate 
production- and sale-related decisions that lead to slowdown of successful 
production and operations of the responsibility centers without any regard to 
the needs of the enterprise. Transfer price established under the cost-based 
method may be the same as the prevailing market price. If the market price is 
lower than the estimated transfer price, the responsibility centre may plan 
new investment to cut the costs incurred by it. 
 
Choice of method for formation of the most appropriate transfer price 
 Analysis of transfer pricing conditions and its methods has suggested 
that method chosen when forming a transfer price should be aimed at 
enhancing the company’s resilience and sustainability on the external market 
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and help assess efficiency, profitability of the responsibility centre that 
supplies the intermediate product. 
 The following equation (Penno, 1990) may be used to assess the 
efficiency, profitability of RC 1 (Fig. 3): 
π (v) = R (v) + TP ∗q(v) − C (v)           (11) 
  where:   (v) – efficiency, profitability of RC 1; 
        (v) – revenue earned by the responsibility centre, if the 
intermediate product is sold on the external market; 
     TP – transfer price; 
     q (v) –quantity of the intermediate product sold on the intra-
company market; 
      C (v) – costs incurred by RC 1. 
Profitability, efficiency of RC2 are calculated under equation (Penno, 
1990): 
π 	(v) = R 	(v) − TP	 ∗q(v) − C (v)          (12) 
where: π 	(v) – efficiency, profitability of RC 2; 
   R 	(v) – revenue from the end-product on external market; 
   C 	(v) – costs incurred by RC 2. 
 Equations (11) and (12) may be used to determine, which 
responsibility centre has more influence on the total corporate profit. 
Responsibility centres must be motivated through certain compensation 
schemes based on their results: revenue from sale of goods on the external 
and intra-company market, costs saved, size of investment. Compensations 
to responsibility centres may be calculated under the following equations 
(Penno, 1990):  
Z (v) = R (v) + TP ∗q(v) − C (v)             (13) 
Z 	(v) = R 	(v) − TP	 ∗q(v) − C (v)          (14) 
where: Z 	(v) – compensation to RC 1; 
   Z 	(v) – compensation to RC 2. 
 In order to motivate employees at the responsibility centre, the centre 
manager may distribute the compensation among employees or use it for 
new investment for reduction of costs of the responsibility centre.  
In general, it may be suggested that the choice of methods for transfer price 
formation is related to motivation and coordination of actions of first-line 
managers at the autonomous responsibility centre. If the transfer price is not 
beneficial to a responsibility centre, the responsibility centre may reject it, 
choose other method, purchase or sell the intermediate product on the 
external market.  
 
Conclusion 
 In order to form a transfer pricing system in a company, the company 
must be decentralized. A decentralized company comprised of profit 
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(responsibility) centres aims at the increase of company profitability, as well 
as improvement of implementation of common corporate goals through 
pursuit of goals of the responsibility centres. In implementation of transfer 
pricing, the aim is to provide better motivation to the managers in charge of 
responsibility centres in adoption of efficient decisions. It is, therefore, 
important to choose the method that is beneficial to all responsibility centres 
that participate in the transaction(s) and the company.  
 Market price is applied to transfer pricing, if a product has the market 
price; while in case no market price is available for the product, other 
transfer pricing methods apply. Transfer price may be market-based, based 
on costs incurred by the responsibility centres (cost-based), or established by 
agreement between the responsibility centres (negotiation-based transfer 
pricing method).    
 Market-based transfer price is formed with reference to the market 
price only, as this approach follows the rule of thumb stating that transfer 
price shall not exceed the external market price. Discount approach offered 
by the researchers for formation of transfer price is not characteristic of the 
transfer pricing based on market price only, which means that applicability 
of other methods should be analysed prior to search for rationale behind 
application of discounts.   
 Negotiated transfer price is formed as a result of negotiations 
between managers in charge of the responsibility centres. Transfer price is 
formed during negotiations with reference to the market price or product, or 
costs incurred by the responsibility centre. Thus, negotiated transfer price 
method is, to a certain extent, a combination of the two other methods. 
Therefore, if transfer price is formed under this method, behaviour of the 
external market participants, production capacity of the responsibility centre 
and its utilization, skills of the managers of responsibility centres in 
coordination of interests of all stakeholders (responsibility centres and 
company), traditions of corporate communication should be considered. 
 Cost-based transfer pricing method is the most common. This method 
offers the widest possibilities for formation of transfer price, as it allows 
choosing the costs as the basis of the transfer price. The costs may be 
standard, actual, variable, marginal, or total costs. Moreover, this method 
usually involves application of the mentioned system of discounts. Thus, the 
estimated transfer price is the representation of the total cost per product unit 
incurred by the responsibility centre transferring the intermediate products, 
reduced by the available discount.  
 In general, the analysis of transfer price formation methods has 
suggested that, irrespective of the type, a transfer pricing method must 
always ensure that the transfer price does not exceed the potential market 
price (TP ≤ p). During estimation of the transfer price, the possibility for 
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division to gain profit and receive compensation from the central 
management must be considered. Estimated intra-company profitability 
indicators of the responsibility centres will help assess the most beneficial 
method of transfer pricing both for the responsibility centres and the entire 
company. Compensation to the responsibility centre may be used in an 
employee motivation scheme or for new investment. 
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